



STUDY GUIDE



**AGENDA: FORMULATING FEASIBLE
SOLUTIONS TO THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO**

28TH MARCH, 1999

LMCMUN 2024



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THE EXECUTIVE BOARD'S ADDRESS

Greetings delegates!

On behalf of the Executive Board, it gives us immense pleasure to welcome you to this session of the Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe of LMCMUN 2024.

Today is 28th March, 1999, just four days after NATO executed Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. An air of suspense has gripped the international community and the entirety of Europe as NATO's rhetoric is growing increasingly assertive in response to escalating tensions in Kosovo. Against a backdrop of mounting apprehension, the world holds its collective breath, awaiting the pivotal moment that could tip the scales toward conflict or resolution. In the streets of Kosovo, civilians brace themselves for the unknown, their anxiety mirrored by global concerns over the unfolding crisis.

Each passing moment amplifies the gravity of the situation, heightening the stakes in a geopolitical gamble with repercussions that could reverberate far beyond the Balkans. A country plagued by years of war is finally reaching the climax of its crisis and it is up to you, delegates, to decide how this situation will reach its end. After ethnic and geopolitical tensions escalate and the international community struggles to reach a solution they agree on, our committee is the deciding factor of the lives of millions of people at stake.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) serves as a vital platform for fostering dialogue and collaboration among its participating States. Established during the Cold War, it focuses on comprehensive security, addressing politico-military, economic, and environmental aspects, all of which this crisis severely requires at this point of time.

Brace yourselves delegates as this committee will be fast-paced, have a varied amount of updates and will test every skill that a delegate requires while also simultaneously giving you a real-time experience of what the world faced at that point of time. The committee is such, if not dealt with properly, its escalation would result in catastrophic destruction.

We, as the Executive Board, look forward to your discussions, speeches and negotiations focusing on NATO's intervention in the region, UNSC's silence on such a grave situation and lastly but most importantly bringing stability in Europe. We expect the delegates to come together with creative ideas that will benefit our agenda through the committee. We hope to inculcate a committee environment that offers constructive debate, and cooperative dialogue, to reach a hopeful yet realistic resolution as the future of Europe lies in your hands, delegates. We eagerly look forward to your presence in the committee and wish you all the very best for the



three days of the conference ahead! You are advised to go through the study guide to get a basic idea of the crisis at hand. However, the information provided in this guide is by no means exhaustive and you are free to gather more research to know what will give you the key to making this committee a success. Lastly, every delegate is important in this committee and let us reemphasise, the future is in your hands.

We hope to make this committee a success with humour, memories and lessons learnt. If you have any further queries, please feel free to ask us via the committee E-mail ID.

Until May,
The Executive Board,
The Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
La Martiniere Calcutta Model United Nations 2024,
oscelmcmun24@gmail.com.





ABOUT COMMITTEE

“Power is not just about who you know or what you have; it is about how well you can control your own destiny.”

*-Michael Corleone,
The Godfather*

Power. It is a force that both shapes and shatters the destiny of humanity. Yet, amidst the chaos, it possesses the remarkable ability to bind us together, to forge alliances, and to catalyze change. Delegates, within the corridors of this committee, you wield the power to influence and shape the course of history.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) stands as a beacon of diplomacy and cooperation, dedicated to the pursuit of peace, stability, and human rights. Our agenda is clear: to address the Kosovo Crisis with the utmost diligence, empathy, and resolve.

The Kosovo Crisis, with its intricate web of ethnic tensions, political rivalries, and historical grievances, presents a formidable challenge to the international community. From the ashes of Yugoslavia's dissolution emerged turmoil and turbulence, fueled by the aspirations of the Albanian population for self-determination and the resistance of Serbian authorities to secession, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rose as a formidable force, challenging the authority of the Yugoslavian Security Forces and igniting a cycle of violence that would engulf the region for years to come. The OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission played a pivotal role in monitoring and documenting human rights abuses, facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties, and laying the groundwork for a peaceful resolution. However, the specter of intervention loomed large, culminating in NATO's controversial military campaign in Kosovo, which sought to halt the atrocities committed by Serbian forces and pave the way for the establishment of a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

Delegates, as we navigate the complexities of the Kosovo Crisis, let us remember the human toll of our deliberations. Behind every statistic lies a story of loss, resilience, and hope. It is incumbent upon us to honor the sacrifices of those who have suffered and to strive for a future where such tragedies are relegated to the annals of history. In the face of uncertainty and adversity, let us harness the power of dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation to chart a course towards peace and reconciliation. Let us transcend the limitations of geopolitics and national interests to embrace our shared humanity and forge a brighter future for generations to come.

The stage is set, delegates. The power is in your hands. Let us rise to the occasion and shape history's narrative with courage and conviction.



SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREEZE DATE - 28TH MARCH, 1999

On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a military campaign aimed at halting the violence in Kosovo and compelling the Yugoslav government to withdraw its forces from the region. On March 25 diplomatic ties between the Yugoslav government and the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were severed.

Ethnic Albanians started migrating to Albania and Macedonia after being driven from their homes in Kosovo from 27th march. Concurrently, the Russian Duma passed a motion denouncing the acts of NATO and delaying the ratification of the Start II agreement. Despite the ongoing airstrikes, Yugoslav forces continued their operations in Kosovo, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and international condemnation.

NATO airstrikes caused significant damage to Yugoslav military capabilities but also resulted in civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction. The Serbian military retaliated by increasing its crackdown on Kosovo Albanians, leading to further displacement and suffering.

The committee commences at an extremely pivotal point in history giving you, delegates, the opportunity to curb the damages caused, alter the timeline and rebuild a free Kosovo bringing stability to Europe while simultaneously bringing out the skills of diplomacy and negotiations.



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe



ETHNIC TENSIONS

The most revered churches and monasteries in the Serbian empire were located in Kosovo in the fourteenth century. The Serbs surrendered the region to the Ottoman Turks in 1389 after a bloody conflict at Kosovo Polje, also known as the Field of Blackbirds. The Battle of Kosovo brought all Serbs who revere Kosovo as their Jerusalem, their holy territory, together. Neighbouring Albanians kept moving out of their country and settling in the area throughout the course of the next 500 years. By the time the Balkan Wars broke out in 1912 - 1913 and the Serbs retook Kosovo, a sizable section of the population was ethnically Albanian. By the 1950s, their number had increased to a majority as Serbs continued to migrate north.

HISTORY

The defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottomans in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo Polje must be brought up in order to justify Serbia's insistence on holding onto control of the region at all costs. With the retaking of Kosovo, the Serbian people experienced immense joy and were able to free themselves from five centuries of "darkness." However, the local Albanian populace did not celebrate this triumph. The Kosovan Albanian uprising of 1912- 1913 was severely put down.

Serbs residing in Kosovo were subjected to repression and mass expulsion after Italy invaded the region during World War II and turned it over to Albania. Numerous Albanians were part of the Partisan forces that ultimately liberated Kosovo, and perhaps this fact protected the Albanians from brutal post-war reprisals. However, throughout the 20th century, ethnic cleansing, which includes both forced migration and acts of violence, has frequently been employed as a tactic to deal with the Albanian population in Kosovo.

Another event that shaped relations between Serbs and Hungarians was the Second World War. Hungary annexed the regions of Backa and Baranja as a result of the Axis occupation of Vojvodina. Many war crimes, particularly against Serbs, were committed against non-Hungarians during this time. In 1944, when the Partisans retook Vojvodina, the Serbs exacted revenge on the Hungarians by driving them out, imprisoning, and killing many of them. The impact of Hungarian war crimes on Serbs was so great that the Anti Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia officially adopted the ethnic cleansing of Hungarians in 1944.



DURING THE BALKAN WARS

The parts of medieval Serbia that were outside of Serbia's borders after the country's restoration in 1830 were known as Old Serbia and included Kosovo, Metohija, and Rascia. While Muslim Albanian brigands attacked and pillaged Christian Orthodox Serbs and their communities, Old Serbia was ruled by local Albanian pashas. The Albanian League's 1878 claim to the entirety of "Old Serbia for Greater Albania" fuelled the religious animosity between Muslims and Christians and ultimately led to national strife. The situation of the Christian Orthodox Serbs, who made up half the population at the end of the nineteenth century, was severely worsened by the pro-Albanian agitation of Austria-Hungary, the tribal anarchy of Muslim Albanians, and the periodic Albanian uprisings that began after 1908.

The majority of Old Serbia was freed by Serbia in October 1912, while Montenegro seized control of all of Metohija and half of the Rascia region. The majority of Albanians, who had sided with the Ottomans, viewed the emergence of Serbian rule as occupation, whereas the Serb people, who were discriminated against and annihilated, welcomed the Serbian and Montenegrin troops as liberators.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, atrocities against Albanians were carried out by the army and paramilitaries of Serbia and Albania. October 1912 saw the Serbian army invade Ottoman territory, while November 1912 saw Duress taken. The Serbian army perpetrated crimes against the Albanian people when they were under occupation. There are about 21,000 graves in Kosovo where Albanians were slaughtered by the Serbian troops, according to an Albanian imam organization.

SERBIAN NATIONALISM

By 1974, Yugoslavia's communist president Marshal Tito had given Kosovo autonomy in response to the escalating societal turmoil. The six republics that made up the Yugoslavian federation of Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia as well as the two provinces that make up Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were given a significant amount of self-governance under a rewritten constitution.

Since Tito and the Communists established the Yugoslavian federation in 1945, Kosovo and Vojvodina have enjoyed self-rule; nonetheless, the constitutional amendment accorded ethnic Albanians in Kosovo authority over local affairs and equal status for the Albanian language alongside Serbo-Croatian.

Slobodan Milosevic, a budding politician who led the Serbian Communist Party in 1986, was given an opportunity by Tito's death in 1980. Milosevic used the Kosovo problem to inflame



nationalism by taking advantage of the animosity that Serbians had toward ethnic Albanians and Tito. He called for Serbs to fight for the territory they would retake during protests. After taking over as president in 1989, Milosevic eliminated Kosovo's autonomy, drove out Albanians from government positions, closed down the country's media, and outlawed the use of the Albanian language. Following the declaration of independence by ethnic Albanian legislators, Milosevic also disbanded the parliamentary assembly.

TWO KOSOVOS

Two Kosovos were formed during the wider Bosnian war that tore through the former Yugoslavian federation between 1992 and 1995: one in which Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim ethnic Albanians coexisted in unease. The Albanian ethnic majority runs a parallel government with its own elections, notwithstanding the official Serbian government. To pay for social services, the government gathers donations from Albanians living in Kosovo, Albania, and outside. While Serbians rely on Serbian TV and Belgrade newspapers, ethnic Albanians also manage their own colleges and universities and obtain their news from Albanian-language media.

Ibrahim Rugova, a political scientist and writer who was elected "president" in the 1992 shadow government elections, is in charge of the unofficial political organization. Rugova's peaceful opposition to Serbian rule served as impetus for the emergence of an armed guerrilla group that chose to take matters into their own hands.

AGAINST ALBANIANS

The discrimination against Kosovans of Albanian descent on a cultural, political, and legal level is one of the structural factors contributing to the Kosovo problem, along with the underdevelopment of the economy. The tax register from 1455 in Turkey reveals that the Albanians were a minority, making up 4-5% of the total population. After 500 years, their portion amounted to 65%.

One persistently detrimental factor was the repression of Albanian culture. It was against the law to publish any form of Albanian literature or to hold classes in the original language. Voting rights were established, but the Dzemijet movement, the only significant political party for Kosovo-Albania, and its adherents used severe intimidation to keep the group from winning a single mandate in the 1925 legislative elections. The establishment of the "Dictatorship of the King" in 1929 sparked a slow downfall in political activity.



THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was a seismic event in European history, marked by a confluence of historical, political, and ethnic factors. Formed after World War II, Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito's leadership, had maintained a delicate balance among its diverse ethnic and national groups through a unique system of self-management. However, as the Cold War era ended, the suppression of nationalist sentiments gave way to a resurgence of ethnic tensions.

HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA

After WWI, the Paris Peace Conference established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the Balkans. The Serbs favored unitary state and the Croats preferred federalism. The unitarist approach won, leading to a highly centralized state under the Karadjordjević dynasty. King Alexander I declared a royal dictatorship in 1929, renaming it Yugoslavia. Internal tensions persisted. WWII and Axis Powers' invasion in 1941 led to its downfall, questioning its viability as a lasting settlement.

The first Yugoslavia, known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was formed in 1918, after World War 1. It was created from the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro, and what used to be territories in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was occupied by the Axis powers of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during World War 2. The Axis powers installed their own puppet governments which effectively ended the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1945, after the Allied victory in World War 2, Yugoslavia was re-established, this time as a Socialist State, a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It was known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1983, Josip Broz Tito became the first president of the country. Ethnic tensions among the various ethnic groups were kept under control by him. He promoted 'Brotherhood and Unity' between the six republics and always tried to suppress nationalism, sometimes by force. Although he tried to stay neutral with involvement in the Non- Aligned Movement, he and Yugoslavian gained many enemies on both sides of the East vs West conflicts.

Following the country's 1944-1945 liberation from German control by Josip Broz Tito and his communist-led Partisans, Socialist Yugoslavia was established in 1946. With the exception of the area it had taken over from Italy in Istria and Dalmatia, this second Yugoslavia occupied much of the same territory as its predecessor. A federation of six ostensibly equal republics-Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia-replaced the kingdom. In Serbia the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomous status in order to acknowledge the special interests of Albanians and Magyars, respectively. Josip Tito's death in 1980 is often viewed as the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. The main foundations of Yugoslavia included that each of the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia was given equal status, the Yugoslavian economy was on the basis of the Socialist system, and that initially the states were



given more autonomy in the 1960s-70s. It was these foundations which later played a role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

PROBLEMS FACED BY YUGOSLAVIA IN THE 1980s

During the 1980s, the Yugoslavian economy took a turn for the worse, ethnic tensions began to rise, and nationalism began to grow among some of the republics. This, with the fall of communism around the world, all contributed to what would later become the Yugoslav Wars and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Moreover, after the death of Josip Tito, there was no capable leader to take Yugoslavia in the right direction. Since no decision could be taken regarding the presidency situation, each region got equal presidency. Each region got 1/8th part of the presidency, and under this system a decision was taken with majority votes. Even with the implementation of this particular system, problems arose as the different parts of the region had different expectations for the future. Therefore, still no decision was being made regarding the presidency. In 1990, with the disintegration of the USSR, funds from both the USSR and the European countries were stopped, which worsened the economic situation.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC

In 1986, Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of the Serbian region. His supporters and he were uncomfortable with the autonomous provinces of Serbia. Through large protests known as the 'Rallies of Truth', they were able to overthrow the political leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, who were replaced with allies of Milosevic. The other republics openly criticized these actions. In 1989, the autonomy of the province of Kosovo was abolished. The majority of the population being Albanian were extremely unhappy with this decision. This later escalated to the Kosovo Crisis.

THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS

The new state of Yugoslavia under Tito was at first strongly centralized both politically and economically, with power held firmly by Tito's Communist Party of Yugoslavia and a constitution closely modeled on that of the Soviet Union. The League of Communists was the ruling political party in the country but a series of new constitutions promulgated in 1953, 1963, and 1974 brought about an increasingly disorganized union, with the center of power gradually moving from the federal to the municipal, economic, and republican apparatuses of the Communist Party (now renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia). It consisted of 8 members, the six republics as well as the two autonomous provinces. During what would be its last meeting, there was a heated discussion between the Slovenian and Serbian leaders about the structure of Yugoslavia. The Slovenian delegates left the meeting in protest and were soon



followed by the Croatians and the Macedonians. After this the League of Communists was dissolved. Multi-party elections were held in all six republics for the first time.

CROATIAN RIOTS

The Croatian people voted into power the newly established Democratic Union Party. It was moving towards the declaration of independence. For many Serbs in the country, this was concerning because they remembered the terrible acts committed against their people by Croatians during the Holocaust and genocide campaigns. Hence, the Serbs started rebelling. On 25th June, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia both officially declared their independence. Until this point, the Yugoslav Wars were mostly between the Croats and Serbs. With Slovenia declaring its independence, it was also dragged into the war. Two days after its independence began what was known as the Ten-Day War. While this was solved under the sponsorship of the European Community's agreement, things were not so simple for Croatia. Serbian nationalists started taking control of villages which were no longer only Serb dominated parts. This led to the European Community forming the Carrington Plan. However, the plan was not able to pass, since it would make all six republics independent. Serbia, who wanted centralization, voted against the plan. Around this time, Macedonia held a vote on independence which was 95% in favour. Macedonia was the only republic which broke away from Yugoslavia peacefully.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Slovenia and Croatia announced their intention to leave the Yugoslav federation on June 25, 1991. On December 19, Macedonia (now North Macedonia) followed suit, and in February and March 1992, Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats decided to vote for their own independence. On April 27, 1992, Serbia and Montenegro adopted a new constitution to establish a new federation while a civil conflict raged. This event triggered armed conflicts with the Yugoslav People's Army, primarily composed of Serb forces. The subsequent Bosnian War, which erupted in 1992, was marked by a complex web of ethnic and religious rivalries. The conflict saw not only military engagements but also widespread ethnic cleansing, leading to significant humanitarian crises and heinous atrocities. The international community initially hesitated to intervene, but the severity of the humanitarian crisis eventually prompted action. The European Community asked NATO to intervene in 1993. With NATO's help Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to drive out Serbian forces from their territories. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 brought an end to the Bosnian War and established the framework for the present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, divided along ethnic lines into two entities - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided between Muslim Croats and the Serbian republic. By 1995, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia. With this the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially came to an end with



only two of its six republics remaining with it- Serbia and Montenegro. Ultimately, with the death of Josip Tito, the economic, ethical and political problems, and the Bosnian wars, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was inevitable. The breakup of Yugoslavia resulted in the emergence of independent states, each facing the formidable task of establishing stable governments and healing the deep wounds of conflict.



MAP OF YUGOSLAVIA



DAYTON ACCORDS

BACKGROUND AND BOSNIAN WAR

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1946 including Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of its constituent republics. Under Josip Broz Tito's leadership, post-World War II Yugoslavia adopted policies of "brotherhood and unity" to suppress nationalist sentiments and maintain stability. However, Tito's death in 1980 and subsequent economic challenges unleashed long-suppressed ethnic tensions. Nationalist movements advocating for independence gained momentum. The new Yugoslav government imposed significant social, economic, and political changes, leading to general discontent among the populace by the 1980s. This discontent, coupled with the use of nationalist sentiments by politicians, contributed to unstable Yugoslav politics.

By 1989, independent political parties emerged, and multiparty elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia in early 1990. In Bosnia and Herzegovina's December 1990 elections, new parties representing the three major ethnic communities won seats, reflecting their respective demographics. A tripartite coalition administration was formed, but mounting tensions inside and outside Bosnia and Herzegovina made governance challenging. In 1991, "Serb Autonomous Regions" were established in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina with significant Serb populations. The Serb Democratic Party's abstention from governmental sessions and the establishment of a "Serb National Assembly" in Banja Luka further highlighted growing tensions.

As Yugoslavia weakened, conflicts erupted, starting with Slovenia and Croatia declaring independence in 1991. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its diverse population of Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, became a focal point. The intermingling of these ethnic groups, historical grievances, and territorial aspirations set the stage for a brutal conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, leading to a protracted and violent war fueled by ethnic tensions and territorial disputes.

The Bosnian War commenced in April 1992 following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. This move placed Bosnia and Herzegovina in a delicate position. Earlier that year, Franjo Tudjman, Croatia's president, and Slobodan Milošević, Serbia's president, had deliberated the potential partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In November 1991, two Croat "communities" were established in northern and southwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina, resembling the existing "Serb Autonomous Regions." By December, Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to seek recognition of its independence from the European Community (EC), which later became the European Union. A referendum for independence took place from February 29 to March 1, 1992. However, few Bosnian Serbs participated due to the Serbian



Democratic Party's obstruction of voting in most Serb-populated areas. Despite this, nearly two-thirds of participating voters endorsed independence, leading to the formal declaration by Izetbegović, the leader of the Party of Democratic Action, on March 3, 1992.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, conflict erupted in the early 1990s. Ethnic Serbs opposed to the breakup of Yugoslavia engaged in armed struggles to establish separate Serb-controlled territories in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina after these countries declared independence. Simultaneously, Bosniaks and Croats resisted and engaged in military actions, primarily driven by territorial disputes. The Croatian government and ethnic Serbs maintained an uneasy peace until January 1992, when an unconditional ceasefire was achieved. The Washington agreement in March 1994 brought an end to the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats, forming the Bosniak-Croat federation. Despite international efforts, including establishing no-fly zones and humanitarian missions, combat between Croat-Bosniak forces and Serbs persisted.

Operation Storm, a large-scale military campaign in the summer of 1995, led to Bosniak and Croat forces regaining some Serb-held territory in Bosnia, marking a turning point in the conflict. Throughout the war, numerous atrocities occurred, including massacres, forced displacement, and the sieges of cities like Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The siege of Sarajevo, lasting from April 1992 to February 1996, epitomized the brutality of the conflict, with civilians enduring constant shelling, sniper attacks, and dire humanitarian conditions. Srebrenica, designated as a UN safe area, witnessed a horrific genocide in July 1995 despite international presence, resulting in the deaths of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys.

INDEPENDENCE

In February and March 1992, EC negotiators proposed a new ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into "cantons," but these proposals were rejected by the major ethnic parties (Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats). After the United States and European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on April 7, Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups attacked Sarajevo, followed by Yugoslav army units bombarding the city. In April, a coalition of paramilitary groups and Yugoslav army units targeted Bosniak-populated towns in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to the displacement of many Bosniaks in what was termed an ethnic cleansing operation. The Yugoslav army, local



Bosnian Serb forces, and paramilitary groups collaborated to seize about two-thirds of Bosnian territory within six weeks.

From the summer of 1992 onward, the military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained relatively static. The front lines were held by a hastily assembled Bosnian government army and experienced Bosnian Croat forces, although their authority weakened in parts of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. A conflict with Croat forces in 1993–1994 and an international arms embargo weakened the Bosnian government's military capabilities. However, Bosniaks and Croats formed a unified federation in late 1994.

UNPROFOR facilitated humanitarian aid distribution and later expanded its duties to protect designated "safe areas." Bosnian Serbs, controlling nearly 70% of the country by 1994, refused to relinquish territory, hindering peace efforts. NATO's first use of force occurred in February 1994 when it downed Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the no-fly zone. NATO conducted sporadic airstrikes in 1994 and more targeted ones in late 1995 in response to the Srebrenica massacre and a Sarajevo attack. This, along with a Bosniak-Croat ground offensive, prompted Bosnian Serb participation in US-sponsored peace talks in Dayton.

The resulting Dayton Accords federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 49% as a Serb republic and 51% as a Croat-Bosniak federation. A multinational force of 60,000 members was deployed in December 1995 to implement the agreement.

PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS HELD

President Clinton dispatched Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to Europe to present a peace framework. The US also changed its policy significantly, threatening airstrikes against the Serbs if they continued to endanger safe areas or reject peace talks. After Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo in late August 1995, NATO conducted airstrikes against Serb positions, resuming them when the Serbs did not comply with demands. On September 14, Holbrooke persuaded Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić to sign a deal ending the Sarajevo siege and paving the way for peace talks in Dayton, Ohio.

The conference began on November 1, 1995, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. Participants included Presidents Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia, Milošević of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and delegates from the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the EU. The goal was to limit media-driven negotiations and focus on direct talks. Holbrooke led the peace talks, with Carl Bildt, the EU Special Representative, and Igor Ivanov, the Russian



First Deputy Foreign Minister, as co-chairs. After twenty-one days, the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia initiated the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dayton Accords were designed to tackle the intricate issues of governance, territorial control, and ethnic representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They divided the country into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, and Republika Srpska, where Bosnian Serbs were predominant. The accords established a central government, shared institutions, and mechanisms for inter-ethnic cooperation to oversee crucial areas like defense, foreign affairs, and economic policy.

While the Dayton Accords brought an end to active conflict and facilitated the return of displaced individuals, they faced criticism for solidifying ethnic divisions and promoting power-sharing based on ethnicity. The complex governance structure, with its multiple layers and overlapping authorities, led to bureaucratic inefficiencies and political deadlock. Additionally, the accords did not fully address issues of justice, accountability for war crimes, and long-term reconciliation.

Following the Bosnian War and the implementation of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina encountered significant challenges in rebuilding infrastructure, jumpstarting the economy, and fostering unity among deeply divided communities. International support, including peacekeeping forces and aid for post-war reconstruction, played a vital role in stabilizing the country and preventing a return to conflict.


However, the war's legacy continues to impact Bosnia and Herzegovina, manifesting in ethnic tensions, political divisions, and competing nationalist narratives. This has hindered efforts to establish a shared national identity and inclusive governance. Challenges such as corruption, high unemployment, and a slow economy add to the complexities facing the country. Efforts to deal with the aftermath of the Bosnian War and encouragement for reconciliation have been ongoing, although their effectiveness has varied.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has prosecuted individuals, including high-ranking figures, for war crimes. Truth and reconciliation initiatives, along with civil society activism and grassroots endeavours to bridge ethnic divides, have also played a role in healing and promoting dialogue.

In recent times, Bosnia and Herzegovina has encountered additional challenges such as geopolitical tensions, migration issues, and the influence of external factors. Internal divisions, governance challenges, and resistance from some political leaders to necessary reforms for European integration and NATO membership have slowed progress. The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina hinges on addressing systemic weaknesses, promoting inclusive governance,



strengthening the rule of law, and creating economic opportunities for all citizens. International support, diplomatic efforts, and ongoing initiatives for reconciliation and inter-ethnic dialogue are crucial for navigating the complexities of post-conflict transition and building a stable, prosperous, and inclusive society.





RAMBOUILLET AGREEMENT

The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, also known as the Rambouillet Agreement, was a proposed peace deal between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a delegation representing the majority ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. It was named after the Château de Rambouillet, where it was first suggested in early 1999, and was drafted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The immediate cause of the NATO decision to bomb the FRY on March 24, 1999 was Milosevic's refusal to sign the Rambouillet Agreement establishing peace and self-government in Kosovo. The escalation of the fighting between Serb and KLA forces in Kosovo during 1998 and the looming humanitarian crisis engendered by the Serb counterinsurgency operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians into the hills energized the NATO governments and other members of the international community to seek a restoration of peace in the province.

In October 1998, Milosevic, under the threat of NATO bombing, reluctantly agreed to reduce and redeploy elements of the Serb police and military forces stationed in Kosovo and to allow 2000 unarmed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) inspectors to enter the province to verify a cessation of hostilities. However, the Serb massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanians on January 15, 1999, together with other evidence that the unarmed verification mission could not ensure compliance with the troop withdrawal agreement or stem the rising tide of violence in Kosovo, prompted the Contact Group seeking to restore peace in the province to intensify its efforts to reach a peaceful solution.

On January 29, the Contact Group ministers summoned the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian parties to negotiations at Rambouillet, France, to begin on February 6 under the chairmanship of the UK foreign secretary and his French counterpart. The negotiations were to define the terms of an agreement that would provide for a ceasefire, an interim peace settlement and system of self-government for Kosovo, and the deployment of an international force within Kosovo to uphold that settlement. To back up the Contact Group's action, NATO warned both the Serb and Kosovo Albanian parties on January 30 that they must respond to the summons to Rambouillet, halt the fighting, and comply with the October agreement or NATO would "take whatever measures were necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe." Even though both parties were warned, NATO was contemplating military action only against the Serbs. Indeed, the subsequent message delivered to Milosevic was that if the Kosovo Albanians signed the Rambouillet Agreement and he did not, the FRY would be bombed.

The Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became known as "The Rambouillet Accords". It was established with numerous important objectives in mind such as, establishing an immediate and verifiable ceasefire between the parties involved in the conflict, to grant substantial autonomy to Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to deploy an international military presence, including NATO forces, to oversee the implementation of the




agreements and ensure compliance. It had several provisions such as an interim agreement granting Kosovo autonomy for a three-year period during which a political settlement would be negotiated, the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force, known as the Kosovo Verification Mission, to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and monitor compliance, a referendum to be held in Kosovo at the end of the three-year interim period to determine the region's status, subject to international supervision.

However, the failure to secure Serbian consent and address key concerns ultimately led to the collapse of the negotiations and paved the way for widespread violence, obscured international relations and an uncertain future for Yugoslavia.

The Rambouillet talks ultimately failed to produce a negotiated settlement, as Yugoslavia rejected the proposed agreements. The failure of diplomatic efforts at Rambouillet paved the way for NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, in response to escalating violence and humanitarian concerns. The airstrikes conducted by the NATO in Yugoslavia, officially known as Operation Allied Force, led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the establishment of a UN-administered interim administration in the region.

The Rambouillet Agreements represented a significant international effort to resolve the conflict in Kosovo through diplomatic means. These agreements symbolize both the international community's efforts to broker peace and the complexities and challenges involved in such negotiations. While the agreement proposed solutions for Kosovo's self-governance within Yugoslavia, its contentious provisions ultimately led to its rejection by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The subsequent NATO intervention marked a turning point, underscoring the delicate balance between diplomatic negotiations and military action in resolving conflicts.



SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC OF SERBIA



THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

OVERVIEW

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a guerrilla organization from Albania that operated in the late 1990s in Kosovo, a region that was officially under Serb rule but was nonetheless morally Albanian. It emerged in 1996, and its sporadic attacks on Serbian police and politicians steadily escalated over the next two years. By 1998 the KLA's actions could be qualified as a substantial armed uprising. It received large funds from the Albanian diaspora in Europe and the United States, but also from Albanian businessmen in Kosovo. It is estimated that those funds amounted from \$75 million to \$100 million and mainly came from the Albanian diaspora in Switzerland, United States and Germany. Adem Jashari (born Fazli Jashari; 28 November 1955 – 7 March 1998) was one of the founders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Kosovo Albanian separatist militia which fought for the secession of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Despite being intended to dissolve under the provisions of the ensuing peace accords, its former members continue to play a significant role in Kosovo on both sides of the law. It was a key player in the 1999 NATO attack on Yugoslavia.

HISTORY AND FORMATION

Josip Tito, the communist resistance leader, orchestrated the reconstruction of Yugoslavia after World War II, transforming it into a modern federation. The nation comprised two autonomous regions within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, along with six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Its structure roughly corresponded with religious affiliations, with Catholics predominantly among Slovenians and Croats, Orthodox Christians among Serbs and Macedonians, and Muslims scattered across regions, particularly in Bosnia, parts of Macedonia, and Kosovo. Despite these divisions, there were overlaps, such as Muslims in Serbia and Croats in Bosnia. Tito's leadership maintained a policy of suppressing overt ethnic nationalism to uphold unity, which proved effective during his presidency. However, Yugoslavia's cohesion began to unravel following Tito's death in 1980. Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian politician, exploited and amplified Serb nationalism to consolidate power. He stripped Kosovo and Vojvodina of their autonomy to bolster his influence. Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991 due to escalating distrust of Milosevic and his nationalist agenda. Slovenia's independence declaration was swiftly followed by a brief conflict, while Croatia faced a prolonged and brutal struggle against Serb forces, supported by Milosevic, resulting in widespread atrocities. Bosnia declared independence in 1992, triggering a similar pattern of violence as various ethnic groups vied for control, escalating into a devastating conflict.

Amidst all of this, Serbia has stepped up its persecution of Kosovo out of concern that it would also declare its independence. 90% of voters participated in an unofficial referendum held in September 1991, and 98% supported the establishment of an independent "Republic of Kosovo."



Azem Vlasi, the president of Kosovo, was already detained by Milosevic in November 1989, and a state of emergency was declared in March 1989. However, in 1990, Milosevic implemented a systemic strategy of cultural and economic segregation on the ethnic Albanian populace of Kosovo.

ACTIVITIES

Previously, after observing the horrific events in Bosnia and Croatia and the superior might of Serb forces, the leaders of Kosovo in exile had advocated for a campaign of nonviolent resistance. However, in April 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an as-yet-unidentified group, launched four simultaneous attacks on Serbian citizens and security forces in various sections of Kosovo. At first, it was thought to be the work of Serb agent provocateurs, who would subsequently exploit the attacks as a pretext for additional provincial repression. It was, in fact, a gang of western Kosovo Albanians who had become radicalized. Their fundamental tactic was straightforward: to incite Serb forces to take retaliatory action. They believed that by doing this, the larger international community—which had been embarrassed by their tardy involvement in the Bosnian conflict—would be forced to take action in Kosovo.

The cause of the young KLA gained momentum in June 1997 when Albania declared a state of civil insurrection due to economic collapse, despite the initial lack of support from the international community. Weapons depots all over the place were looted, and a lot of them, especially from the west, crossed the border into Kosovo. A guerilla war broke out in western Kosovo during the course of the following year, with the KLA attacking the Serbian government on several occasions. In response, the Serbian Interior Ministry's paramilitary police, who were known for their brutality, were sent in by the Serbs during the conflict in Bosnia. A militia that was commanded by the infamous Serb warlord Arkan also got entangled in the developing conflict.

They established control over the western part of Kosovo. In response, the Serbian government went on the attack against the KLA, forcing them to retreat mostly across the border into Albania. But what came next was indiscriminate brutality against communities in Kosovan Albania that the Serbian forces said were hiding KLA rebels. The Serb armies "ethnically cleansed" villages, killing residents and destroying homes in a reenactment of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. Global reports of Serbian excesses sparked international indignation and increased the KLA's numbers and finances from Albanians living abroad. From being a motley crew of a few hundred radicals, the KLA grew to thousands of members, too many for its training camps to accommodate. Light artillery and anti-aircraft missiles were added to its arsenal, and its ability to breach Albania's border allowed it to conduct fearless border raids.

The guerilla conflict intensified in late 1998 and early 1999, with KLA fighters striking civilian and military targets in Serbia and Serb forces responding in kind. Events of Serb brutality, including the mass murder of forty-five civilians increasing calls for international intervention



from the community of Racak. NATO reacted to the full-scale conflict that broke out in March 1999 by attacking Serb outposts and then Belgrade, the country's capital, with air strikes. After being first pushed back by a fierce Serb advance, the KLA contributed a little bit by striking Serb positions and driving them into the open so that NATO aircraft could attack them.

Despite the United States (a NATO member) having earlier declared that the KLA was a terrorist organization, NATO and the KLA joined forces to oppose Serbian forces. Under international pressure spearheaded by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the United States reluctantly agreed to the air raids, although declined to deploy soldiers to engage in combat on the ground. In response to the airstrikes, Milosevic intensified the ethnic cleansing operations spearheaded by the Serbs to a great extent. 300,000 Kosovo Albanians fled into Albania and Macedonia within a week of the conflict beginning, and by April 1999, the UN estimated that 850,000 had left their homes. Beginning as a motley irregular army to draw attention to Serbia's misdeeds in the Kosovo region, the KLA quickly succeeded where Bosnian and Croat forces had failed, notably in eliciting significant Western intervention into their struggle with Serbia. Over the KLA's brief existence, the group's strategies changed. Its initial goal was to incite Serb forces to take action in order to bring attention to the Kosovo crisis outside of Kosovo. As its power and size increased, it was able to occasionally launch successful strikes, opposing Serb positions in order to drive them from a significant portion of western Kosovo. However, the KLA was never really a threat to the regular army in Serbia. Following the conflict, the KLA adopted a vigilantism strategy in which it drove away the non-Kosovo population and carried out retaliatory assaults against Serb civilians. The KLA amassed a sizable force, but they were never able to outnumber or outmatch Serbian forces.

The KLA would not tolerate NATO operating as an international peacekeeping force or, more accurately, as an occupying force that would be stationed all over Yugoslavia. They suggested establishing a protectorate under UN authority. NATO refused to accept this; thus, bombardment began right away. A few of the major objectives of the KLA included:

1. **Insurgency Operations:** KLA fighters carried out ambushes, sabotage missions, and hit-and-run tactics to weaken Serbian control over Kosovo.
2. **Recruitment and Training:** The organization recruited fighters from within Kosovo and the diaspora, providing training in guerrilla tactics, weapons handling, and military strategy.
3. **Political Advocacy:** Alongside its military activities, the KLA engaged in political advocacy, both domestically and internationally, to garner support for Kosovo's independence cause.
4. **Humanitarian Efforts:** The KLA also provided humanitarian assistance to Kosovo Albanian civilians affected by the conflict, including shelter, food, and medical aid.



HASHIM THACI

In 1998, Hashim Thaci, a prominent Kosovan student, returned from his residence in Switzerland to engage in combat with the KLA. At just thirty years old, throughout the NATO-led conflict he garnered respect for his clarity and unwavering position as the KLA's political head. Thaci proclaimed himself prime minister of a Kosovan government that was provisional following the conflict. It was said that Thaci gave the order to kill at least six senior KLA members in order to solidify his ascent to power. These accusations were denied, and it's likely that Thaci's political opponents made them as part of an effort to damage him. Thaci was also charged with running a racketeering organization out of his self-proclaimed government. Fighting for Kosovo's independence from Serbia was the Kosovan Liberation Army, an irregular military force with nationalist views. Its political leader, Hashim Thaci, stated that goal sought to establish "a liberated, independent Kosovo, and naturally, the democratization of Kosovo." Throughout, Thaci insisted that it was an army and not an "organization," and that it ought to be acknowledged as such. It never combined any political thought with its declared objectives.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

1996: A gang posing as the Kosovan Liberation Army attacked civilian targets within the Serb military.

1997: The KLA gains control of a large arsenal of weapons following the fall of the Albanian government.

1998: The number of clashes between Serb and KLA forces increased.

1999: Massacre in the village of Racak.

1999: KLA plays a modest role in the NATO-led conflict against Serbia.



HASHIM THACI



THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION(KVM)

INTRODUCTION

Before the NATO bombing campaign of 1999, after months of combat between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY), pressure from the international community on President Milosevic finally forced him to sign an agreement on 16 October 1998 with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this agreement, he agreed, inter alia, to adopt a ceasefire, reduce forces to pre-hostilities levels, and ensure the protection of human rights of all peoples of Kosovo. It was nearly ten years since the province's autonomous status had been revoked. Since then, all civil administration, police, boards of education and state company positions were held by Serbs. Albanians essentially had no voice in any of their administration. For ten years, the Albanian majority had attempted to use mostly non-violent means to change the situation. This period had yielded little, and elements of the ethnic Albanian population formed their rebel army known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and proceeded to employ more violent means in an attempt to achieve their political goals. It was hoped that their armed struggle would force the Yugoslav leaders to at least agree to return the province to some sort of autonomous status, or, at best, grant outright independence. Unwilling to lose Kosovo, President Milosevic and the Yugoslav authorities greatly reinforced the Serb police and armed forces in the province and began to suppress the KLA uprising, creating in the process a humanitarian crisis which was seen on television screens around the world in the summer and fall of 1998. The international community brought in several negotiators to pressure Milosevic, but finally, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, a man well known to the Yugoslav President from their Dayton Accord days, traveled to Belgrade, and after difficult negotiations, an agreement was signed. The provisions of the 16 October 1998 agreement stipulated that it was to be verified by a mission of some 2000 unarmed civilian personnel provided by the nations of the OSCE, known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).

THE MISSION IN KOSOVO

Mission Planning and Concept

The OSCE had never before set up such a large and complex mission. The agreement called on 54 nations of the OSCE to provide help. There were no personnel, no equipment, no concepts, and little knowledge of the ground. One month after the signature of the agreement, planning and generation of personnel and equipment had progressed to the point where the head of the planning unit, who had been based at the seat of the OSCE in Vienna, needed to deploy with the nascent HQ of the KVM to Kosovo. The OSCE asked nations for a replacement for him in Vienna, and Canada took up the challenge of heading up the KVM Support Unit. The operational concept of the KVM split the province geographically into five Regional Centres (RCs)



commanded by headquarters in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. The mandate was to verify the 16 October 1998 agreement and report any violations to the OSCE, while trying to make a difference in the lives of the people of Kosovo. The mission was unarmed, the 'Verifiers' wore civilian clothing, and patrolled in contracted armoured vehicles. When it arrived, the KVM was expected to be strictly a verification mission. That is, there would be much counting of weapons and forces, and reporting of compliance or not to the OSCE. In Regional Centre 1 (RC1) (and the same could be said for the mission as a whole), the maintenance of a ceasefire was identified as the 'centre of gravity'. This was the one condition on which all other actions depended; should the ceasefire fail, no other task in the mandate could be carried out. The mission found itself reacting to breaches of the ceasefire to re-establish it before being able to continue its work. The mission therefore could not get into the 'intrusive' verification tasks which had been envisaged in the operational concept.

The Canadian Contribution

Canada agreed to provide the head of the first regional centre established in Kosovo. RC1 was based in Prizren in south Kosovo, on the border with Albania, through which much of the arms smuggling and infiltration took place. As for the remainder of the mission, Canada agreed to participate with up to 100 Verifiers drawn from serving and retired military personnel as well as civilian professionals from various backgrounds. Most Canadians were based in the Regional Centre in Pec, northwest Kosovo, bordering on Albania and Montenegro, but a number of them filled positions in the mission headquarters in Pristina and the other RCs. Canadians were employed as Verifiers, staff, and specialists in such areas as human rights and law.

A Tense Environment

Conditions in the mission area remained very tense throughout the KVM's time in Kosovo. The deep mistrust of the parties for the other side never abated. The mission constantly snuffed out ceasefire violations that began small but which always had the potential to grow into more important incidents. There were several cases of one of the parties advancing into new areas or areas that had been vacated by the other side. The most frustrating incidents were those that were unexplained or non-attributable; finding dead bodies was the most prevalent. At the end of February 1999, over 70 bodies had been found, usually left by the side of the road with evident signs of beating or execution. Abductions on both sides also continued; sometimes responsibility was acknowledged but most cases were attributed to 'uncontrolled elements'. Some examples of the incidents are worth recalling. Combined Yugoslav Army and police forces mounted an operation against the village of Racak in mid-January 1999. The next morning more than 45 dead civilians were found by the KVM, and the Head of Mission declared the Yugoslavs responsible. The mission immediately set up a permanent presence in the village to reassure the population and assist in the investigation. Two weeks later, an ambush by the authorities on suspected KLA



members took place in Rogovo. Twenty-four people were killed (including civilians). The mission was again involved in the follow-up investigation and opened up a permanent location to reassure the villagers. At the end of February 1999, the village of Randubrava was the scene of an action on two consecutive nights which well illustrates the type of work accomplished by the KVM. The Serb police had allegedly decided to gather information from the village and were fired upon by the KLA. When the KVM arrived on the scene, a violent, though localized, firefight had already begun. The police agreed to stop firing and to return to their barracks when the KLA was also convinced to stop.

WITHDRAWAL AND REDIRECTION TO ALBANIA

Evacuation from Kosovo

Cease-fire violations were the norm, and as the chance of an agreement on the final status of Kosovo seemed to be approaching, the ranks of the KLA were swelled by men of all ages anxious to be able to say that they had played a part in the 'liberation'. This fact created problems for the KLA who had no means of training or employing so many raw recruits. The main areas of fighting were north of the principal border crossing into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and near the Albanian border. In some areas, only the presence of the KVM prevented outright hostilities. In other areas the KVM seemed to be a pawn of the parties, relegated to recording incidents and their perpetrators. In any case, the risk-benefit balance of the KVM was tilting towards the former. On 20 March 1999, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE decided to withdraw the KVM for safety reasons, and perhaps as another means of putting pressure on Yugoslav authorities, who were being threatened with air strikes. Plans had been developed and honed for the eventuality of an evacuation, and the operation went off with little trouble. Serb security forces were remarkably docile in their reaction to the withdrawal.

The Kosovo Verification Mission was put together in record time. Elements of the headquarters were in Kosovo one month after the mission's authorization on 16 October 1998, and the first personnel were deployed to the Regional Centres on 28 November. Within 90 days the KVM was deployed in all parts of Kosovo, serving effectively in reducing tensions and assisting the local population. The importance of the 'centre of gravity' in a peace operation (in Kosovo, the ceasefire) cannot be overemphasized. The lack of a ceasefire, or constant breaches of it, kept the mission off balance, fostered provocation, and led to internally displaced persons and retaliatory actions. Particularly in Regional Centre 1, efforts were successful in wresting the initiative from the parties and keeping them reacting to KVM's requests, changes in patrolling patterns, initiatives and plans for reduction of tensions. The 'centre of gravity' was maintained in locations where the KVM was able to establish a presence in Kosovo. The Contact Group and the OSCE pressed for political action, and the Rambouillet conference was called. At the same time, the actions of the KVM on the ground succeeded in holding the situation in a 'semi-stable state' to allow the peace process to continue. In other conflicts, action has often been less rapid.



Standards were required against which the performance of the parties could be measured; like the number of weapon systems in certain areas, human rights standards, court monitoring standards, etc. It was therefore impossible to compare (verify) the performance of the parties against accepted standards. What was required was to translate the agreements and the UN Security Council resolutions regarding Kosovo into practical, usable information for the Verifiers. The need for a quick reaction force and a reserve was reinforced, especially with the thin distribution of Mission personnel. As soon as there was any indication of a problem, from any source, the KVM was able to react quickly and flood the area with bright orange OSCE vehicles to calm the local population and get to the bottom of the problem.

The use of mature Verifiers — the average age in the mission area was close to 45 — meant they were able to operate independently, and they had great credibility with both Serbs and Albanians. This type of employment concept would have been impossible with young soldiers. All the normal problems of a multi-national or UN-type mission were apparent in the KVM. Among the problems were the lack of English-language capability among the Verifiers, inadequate passage of information, difficulty in coordinating actions, differences in cultural work habits, and a tendency to hoard information and centralize functions. The focus of the headquarters staff was on itself instead of on the work being done in the field. An All-Agency Coordination Centre was established in Regional Centre 1. This was a large room with a map showing the most current information, including a mine trace, as well as desks and chairs, computers and printers. The idea was to support International and Non-Government Organizations by making a room available to them where they could come and exchange information or use the facilities to work.

Once a week, a meeting was held with all interested parties to pass information. Although IOs/NGOs are renowned for not wanting to be ‘coordinated’, they felt so welcome that they attended regularly. Logistics was a constant challenge as all equipment and vehicles had to be acquired or contracted. This was alternate service delivery at its best, and for the most part, worked well. There were limitations, however. The need to accept tenders, the integration of personnel and equipment into a working whole, and a lack of flexibility in the timing and speed of contract fulfillment were the major challenges. In a humanitarian operation such as that in Albania, proper targeting and establishment of a niche role for the force is the most important observation to be made.





ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Before the eruption of widespread violence in Kosovo in 1996, the economic landscape of the region within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was marked by a myriad of structural deficiencies and systemic challenges. These economic maladies, deeply entrenched in years of mismanagement, systemic corruption, and the weight of international sanctions, had rendered the Yugoslav economy increasingly vulnerable since the early 1990s. The dissolution of the nation following the collapse of communism and the subsequent regional conflicts had precipitated a steady decline in economic performance.

Underpinning the socio-economic fabric of Kosovo was a complex tapestry of ethnic tensions, notably between the ethnic Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. Systemic biases in employment, education, and public services perpetuated disparities, hindering economic mobility and exacerbating social divisions. Ethnic Albanians faced significant hurdles in accessing employment opportunities and quality education, resulting in an underutilization of human capital and a widening economic gap between ethnic groups.

The economic marginalization of ethnic Albanians contributed to feelings of disenfranchisement and resentment, fuelling ethnic tensions and political unrest. As political dissatisfaction escalated in 1997, Kosovo became a hotbed of discontent, with ethnic Albanians demanding greater autonomy or outright independence from Serbian rule. Protests and demonstrations proliferated, disrupting economic activities and creating a climate of uncertainty that deterred investment and undermined economic stability.

Concurrently, international sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia further isolated the region economically, restricting trade and investment opportunities. The sanctions exacerbated the economic challenges facing Kosovo, constraining economic growth prospects, and exacerbating already dire socio-economic conditions. The embargo hindered access to essential resources, impeding industrial production and exacerbating unemployment.

The intensification of the Kosovo crisis in 1998 unleashed a wave of conflict, disrupting economic activities and exacerbating socio-economic disparities. The breakdown of law and order, coupled with the displacement of populations, disrupted supply chains, and hindered the functioning of markets. Economic sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing were particularly hard hit, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty.

On March 24, 1999, the intervention by NATO further exacerbated the economic turmoil in Kosovo. The bombing campaign targeted strategic infrastructure, causing extensive damage to transportation networks, utilities, and industrial facilities. Factories were destroyed, roads were rendered impassable, and power grids were crippled, leading to a severe disruption in economic activities. The destruction of vital infrastructure compounded the economic challenges facing Kosovo, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian crisis and hindering recovery efforts.



In the aftermath of the NATO intervention, the imposition of international sanctions and trade restrictions further compounded the economic challenges facing Kosovo. Import and export bans, coupled with financial sanctions, stifled economic recovery efforts and exacerbated inflationary pressures. The lack of access to international markets further hindered economic diversification and limited opportunities for foreign investment, prolonging the economic downturn and hindering long-term economic development.

In summary, the economic situation before and after March 28, 1999, during the Kosovo crisis was characterized by deep-rooted structural deficiencies, exacerbated by political instability, ethnic tensions, and armed conflict. The economic toll of the crisis was profound, leading to widespread poverty, unemployment, and economic dislocation. The legacy of this crisis continues to shape the economic trajectory of Kosovo and the broader region, highlighting the lasting impacts of political and social instability on economic development.





KOSOVO REFUGEE CRISIS

Kosovo Albanian refugees and to a lesser extent, the internally displaced Kosovo Albanians, became a humanitarian question for NATO with the political stakes of their humanitarian operations. The Kosovo refugee crisis refers to the mass displacement of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo due to escalating tensions and violence in the region. This crisis was part of the broader Kosovo conflict, which began in the late 20th century as tensions rose between ethnic Albanians, who comprised the majority of Kosovo's population, and the Serbian government, which sought to maintain control over the region. Before March 28th, 1999, substantial refugee movements were underway from Kosovo due to confrontations between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian rebels, alongside escalating repression and human rights violations targeting ethnic Albanians by Serbian authorities. However, the crisis intensified dramatically in late March 1999 with the onset of NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, which aimed to halt the Serbian government's crackdown on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

The NATO airstrikes, which began on March 24th, 1999, in response to the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Kosovo. Serbian forces intensified their campaign against ethnic Albanian civilians, leading to widespread atrocities, massacres, and the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. By late March 1999, the refugee crisis had reached a critical point, with hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo to seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The refugee crisis set the stage for further escalation and international intervention in the Kosovo conflict, ultimately leading to the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces and the eventual end of the conflict with the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.

NATO's public statements on the Kosovo issue from early 1998 onwards consistently highlighted the displacement of Kosovo Albanians as a significant concern. For instance, during the initial months of 1998, the Albanian delegation consistently and somewhat effectively brought up the Kosovo crisis within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. On March 27, 1998, NATO made the decision to dispatch eight expert groups to Albania. These teams included specialists in civil emergency planning who were tasked with assisting Albanian authorities in preparing for a potential surge of refugees, particularly in border areas. Although there may have been a humanitarian side to its concern, the Atlantic News in NATO was dominated by the possible impact of violence in Kosovo on regional stability. In addition, there was also an interest in developing the substantial significance of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. While NATO had previously employed humanitarian rhetoric, the issue of the Kosovo Albanians shifted distinctly to a direct humanitarian policy concern only after the suspension of negotiations for an interim peace agreement in Rambouillet on March 19, 1999. The catalyst for this shift was the exodus of Kosovo Albanians into neighboring countries, including Montenegro, following the suspension of negotiations, escalated Serbian aggression, and the commencement of airstrikes. Within the initial two days of Operation Allied Force,



approximately 15,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees fled to the FYROM, while around 18,000 sought refuge in Albania.

Following the NATO airstrikes on Yugoslavia, the Albanian government encountered severe humanitarian and financial challenges. The influx of refugees into Albania showed no signs of abating, with NATO sources indicating that over eight hundred thousand individuals were displaced within Kosovo at the time of writing. Seeking refuge in Albania, they anticipated safety, basic necessities, and humane treatment. Despite Albania's impoverished status, it remains steadfast in providing sanctuary to traumatized Kosovo refugees, in line with a historical tradition of solidarity. However, the generosity and resources of Albania alone are insufficient to address this significant and unprecedented crisis without substantial international economic assistance and political backing. The urgency of the situation is undeniable, with Albanian appeals for assistance being notably modest. Ultimately, the Albanian government implores the global community to not allow the humanitarian crisis to escalate into an economic and financial catastrophe, emphasizing the potential worsening of the situation if swift action is not taken.

The Kosovo Albanians quickly became an object of humanitarian policy for NATO (in addition to featuring as a face of human suffering that partly justified NATO's participation in the diplomatic process and the launching of its air campaign). NATO's role evolved beyond being solely a military and diplomatic alliance to encompass a humanitarian agency, directly engaging in humanitarian efforts on the ground. NATO established tent camps, coordinated humanitarian efforts, provided protection, conducted airlift operations to evacuate people from the region, and engaged in various other forms of assistance. In essence, NATO allocated a portion of its resources to aid and safeguard the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The distinction between NATO's humanitarian assertions before and after March 23, 1999, was that NATO directly engaged in humanitarian operations shortly after that date. Dennis McNamara, who became UNHCR Special Envoy in the Balkans when the Kosovo crisis exploded, refers to a competition between the UNHCR and NATO. Governments see bilateral programs serving national interests more effectively.

Refugees and internally displaced persons can trigger a humanitarian interest and structure a field of humanitarian practices arranged about this interest in a specific context. The Kosovo Albanians emerged and helped to trigger the humanitarian field. In relation to the field, they became a figure of persecuted people requiring assistance and protection from states and international and transnational organizations. However, simply displacing people does not automatically generate an interest in offering assistance and protection.

Never before had a refugee crisis been so interlaced with big-power politics, involving virtually every important capital in the world and a military campaign by the most powerful military alliance, NATO, ever assembled. And never before had what all the major players insisted was fundamentally a humanitarian problem produced such a profound aftershock.



THE PLAYING POLITICAL POWERS

NATO

On March 31, 1998, United Nations Security Council adopted resolution number 1160, imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia until it withdrew its special police force from Kosovo, accepted outside mediation, and began a substantive dialogue with the ethnic Albanians, but the resolution had only a temporary impact. By June, NATO declared its intentions to intervene militarily in Kosovo if there was no improvement in the situation. On January 30, 1999 NATO agreed to the use of air strikes, if required, and issued a warning to both sides in the conflict. These initiatives resulted in initial negotiations held at Rambouillet, near Paris, from February 6 to February 23, 1999, and were followed by a further round of negotiations in Paris, from March 15 to March 18, 1999. At the end of the second round of negotiations, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the talks broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation. NATO launched an air campaign, Operation Allied Force, on 24 March 1999 to halt the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo. It intervened militarily in Kosovo with airstrikes against Yugoslav/Serbian targets in March 1999 post the failure of Dayton peace deal in 1995 and other diplomatic efforts to resolve the escalating violence. The airstrikes targeted military infrastructure, government buildings and Serbian security forces.

The NATO intervention aimed to end the conflict halting the ethnic cleansing and violence perpetrated by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanians. NATO's intervention played a decisive role in paving the way for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. The political significance of NATO's humanitarianism was that its reputation for competence and its image of respectability and honour depended to an extent on how well it supported the international assistance to the Kosovo Albanians. The air campaign forced Milosevic to submit to NATO's demands and laid the foundation for the implementation of peace. A NATO-led international force began to deploy immediately on the heels of the Serb withdrawal, its mission being to implement the peace agreement and secure a safe return of thousands of Kosovan refugees. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis raised a number of questions. Basic principles of state sovereignty and human rights came into conflict with each other as the operation was in violation of recognised international laws and conventions.



NATIONS THAT SUPPORTED NATO

The US and UK supported NATO's efforts in the Kosovo crisis through diplomatic backing, military contributions to Operation Allied Force, humanitarian assistance, and rallying political and public support for the intervention. They played key roles in addressing the humanitarian catastrophe and seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

France and Italy along with US and UK supported NATO's efforts in Kosovo through military contributions, diplomatic backing, and humanitarian assistance, aiding in the alliance's mission to address the crisis and alleviate the suffering of affected civilians.

Greece had concerns about potential spillover effects and instability in the broader Balkan region, particularly due to its proximity to Kosovo and its historical ties to the region's ethnic groups. Despite these concerns, Greece supported NATO's efforts to address the crisis diplomatically and militarily if necessary, within the framework of international law and collective security agreements.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO FOR CHINA AND RUSSIA

China and Russia were remarkably offended by the air campaign against Yugoslavia executed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from March till June in 1999. China and Russia considered the war in Kosovo as an aggressive war against Yugoslavia, a sovereign state which is out of NATO's area, perpetrated by NATO under the leadership of the United States, and they also perceived from this aggression the reinforcement of the unipolar world order with only superpower U.S. The political and military leaderships of the two countries started to review their defense policies because they recognized the U.S. policy of pursuing its global supremacy as an increasing military threat to them. And the war in Kosovo strongly affected the East Asian strategic environment because it gave China and Russia a chance to reinforce the strategic partnership between them. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) arose in the early 1990s amid rising tensions between Kosovo's Albanian populace and Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian regime. Composed mainly of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, the KLA emerged in response to Belgrade's oppressive policies, aiming to secure Kosovo's autonomy or full independence.

The KLA's founders, disenchanted with the discrimination and human rights violations against ethnic Albanians, many with military backgrounds or ties to Albanian nationalist groups, viewed armed resistance as the primary avenue to challenge Serbian dominance. Before March 28, 1999, the KLA undertook various tactics to challenge Serbian control, including guerrilla warfare such as ambushes and sabotage against Serbian military targets. They also pursued diplomatic and propaganda efforts to rally international support, shedding light on the plight of Kosovo Albanians under Serbian rule. Additionally, the KLA provided crucial protection and assistance to Kosovo's Albanian populace, particularly in areas facing persecution or violence from Serbian forces. They effectively established control over certain Kosovo regions, operating as a parallel



authority to Serbian rule. However, the KLA's actions triggered a severe response from the Serbian government, leading to escalating violence and widespread human rights abuses on both sides. The conflict in Kosovo garnered international condemnation, especially during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.

NATO's intervention in March 1999, after failed diplomatic attempts, marked a pivotal moment. Airstrikes against Serbian military targets compelled Milosevic's regime to withdraw from Kosovo.

In March 28, 1999, endeavors were characterized by armed resistance, diplomatic outreach, and establishing territorial control. Their struggle, coupled with NATO intervention, precipitated the withdrawal of Serbian forces and Kosovo's path to independence.



THE KLA



NATO INTERVENTION & OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

WHY WAS OPERATION ALLIED FORCE LAUNCHED?

NATO warned both sides of the confrontation on January 30, 1999, and consented to use air power if necessary. Due to these efforts, preliminary talks were placed in Rambouillet, close to Paris, between February 6 and February 23, 1999. These were followed by more talks in Paris, which took place between March 15 and March 18, 1999.

The planned peace deal was signed by the Kosovar Albanian delegation at the end of the second round of negotiations, but the Serbian delegation did not sign, and the negotiations broke up. Following this, and in direct violation of the agreement from October 1998, Serbian military and police forces intensified their operations against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, deploying additional troops and state-of-the-art tanks into the area. Thousands of people started to leave their homes in response to this organized attack. Following several acts of provocation on both sides and the use of disproportionate force by the Serbian military and police, the situation in Kosovo flared up again at the start of 1999. This included the 15 January killing of forty unarmed peasants in the village of Racak.

The international community grew more concerned about the conflict's escalation, its humanitarian effects, and its potential to spread to other nations. They were also alarmed by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's disdain for diplomatic attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and the militant group Kosovar Albanians' destabilizing role. After almost a year of fighting within the province and the failure of international efforts to resolve the dispute diplomatically, the decision was made to intervene. Government leaders gave two main justifications for their consent, according to NATO officials: the necessity to avert a humanitarian crisis and to uphold NATO's stated commitment.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

On March 24, 1999, NATO launched its involvement, known as "Operation Allied Force," in an attempt to stop the humanitarian disaster that was then occurring in Kosovo.

During the attacks, the United States ran into opposition from European nations who maintained that the alliance needed clear U.N. approval before it could launch an attack on a sovereign state. The US contended that this provision would give Russia and China, two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the ability to permanently reject any military operations carried out by NATO.



Hubert Vedrine, the foreign minister of France, expressed his satisfaction that all peaceful means had been used. Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, expressed intransigence in the face of numerous appeals, suggesting that France agreed with the assertion that airstrikes were the only option.

WHAT/WHO WAS THE TARGET?

NATO's Operation Allied Force began a methodical air campaign to target, disrupt, and weaken the military might of the Serbs and discourage more operations by them. The initial goals of the NATO operation were to stop the aggressor from continuing and becoming more intense, as well as to destroy, isolate, and interdict the forces of the Yugoslav Army and the Special Police (MUP) inside and outside of Kosovo.

The allied campaign targeted a variety of tactical groups. These included targets that supplied Serbia's military and security apparatus, such as the integrated air defense system, higher level command and control, petroleum storage facilities, and logistics troops stationed outside of Kosovo that might support or reinforce forces within the country.

The Serbian people were not the target of the campaign. The campaign intensified over time, concentrating on the forces of repression at all levels in an attempt to force them to alter their behaviour or, in the event that they were unable, to weaken and eventually destroy their instruments of repression. The campaign made the largest use of precision weapons in an air operation to date.

OPERATION

Operation Allied Force was intended by NATO to be a three-day bombing operation aimed at forcing Milosevic to comply with their demands as soon as possible. Operation Deliberate Force, a two-week operation in Bosnia that swiftly forced Serbian forces to the bargaining table at Dayton, served as the model for the campaign designed by NATO planners.

Aircraft attacking from bases in Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave the bombing campaign a great start. NATO even shot down three MiG-29s, Serbia's most sophisticated fighter, on the first day. However, Milosevic resisted. Leaders of NATO quickly accepted a longer list of targets and consented to increased bombing.



During the campaign, the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt was cruising in the Adriatic Sea, and 1,000 aircraft were operating out of air bases in Germany and Italy. Over 38,000 combat missions were flown by NATO aircraft in the ten weeks of hostilities. NATO launched its bombing operation against Yugoslavia on March 24 at 19:00 UTC. The first NATO aircraft to bomb Belgrade and carry out SEAD missions were Spanish Air Force F/A-18 Hornets. In the Adriatic, ships and submarines launched BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Serbian television asserted that NATO bombardment, not Yugoslav military actions, was the reason for the massive streams of people leaving Kosovo. The Yugoslav side and its Western backers asserted that the migration of refugees was mostly driven by fear of NATO bombs and that the mass panic among Kosovo Albanians was the cause of the outflows.

The United Nations brought war crimes charges against Milosevic and other officials in charge of overseeing the Kosovo conflict on the grounds of atrocities committed against civilians in the region. On March 29, 1999, Jat Airways withdrew about thirty of its fleet of civilian aircraft from Belgrade to neighboring countries for protection in order to avoid potential destruction.

NATO's intervention did not obtain authorisation by the UN Security Council. NATO members did not seek a supportive vote of the General Assembly within the framework "Uniting for Peace" as established by its Resolution 377 that states:

"if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including [...] the use of armed force when necessary".

The questions surrounding NATO's involvement in the Kosovo crisis were numerous, considering the operation violated established international laws and treaties, fundamental notions of state sovereignty and human rights came into conflict. The operation's goals were to lessen human suffering and establish peace and stability in the area.



LEGAL CONTEXT:

Legally speaking, NATO may act as a regional arrangement or agency to promote international peace and security as long as its actions are in line with the UN's goals and principles (Article 52). However, Article 53 makes it very clear that no enforcement action may be carried out under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the Security Council's approval.

The majority of legal experts concur that the airstrikes against Serbia were unlawful under that clause as the Security Council never gave its approval. Some academics who lean towards libertarianism use the law of "collective emergency" or humanitarian law as justifications for NATO's actions. The international community may be justified in taking action in response to any egregious breach of humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity, breaches of human rights, the Geneva Conventions, and ethnic cleansing, as these violations have global ramifications and transcend the sacred notion of a state's domestic jurisdiction.

The goal of NATO's operation was to stop more crimes from being committed and shield Kosovo's civilian population from the brutality of Yugoslav government forces. This is in line with the humanitarian intervention principle, which states that when there is an urgent need to save civilians from serious and imminent harm, military action may be justifiable.

COORDINATED CRISIS RESPONSE:

The European Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was created at NATO in 1998 and has been coordinating NATO's assistance to UNHCR for its humanitarian operations in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. When a significant number of forced expulsions and refugees were brought about by the Kosovo situation, the EADRCC established a strong working connection with its UNHCR colleagues. UNHCR turned to NATO for assistance in:

- Managing the airlift of relief supplies.
- Easing pressure on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by transferring some refugees to NATO countries on a temporary basis.
- Offloading and providing immediate storage of aid cargoes.
- Setting up refugee camp sites and
- Providing information regarding numbers and locations of internally displaced persons (IDPs).



HOW DID THE INTERVENTION AFFECT THE CRISIS?

Over 1.5 million Kosovans were ejected from their homes as a result of the ethnic cleansing effort carried out by Serbia; almost a million of them fled or were driven from Kosovo. The people of Kosovo endured immense suffering as a result, while neighbouring Albania, the former Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were all significantly impacted. A significant relief effort was launched by the worldwide community to aid the refugees and the most impacted nations.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), spearheading this endeavour, fostered close collaboration between donor countries, neighbouring countries, and international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The most important aspect of the entire humanitarian operation was the enormous participation of NATO, its member nations, and its allies. Despite not being a humanitarian organisation, NATO was able to successfully alleviate thousands of refugees' suffering thanks to its immense powers.

In brief, responding to the growing unrest in the area, NATO commenced attacking Serbia and Kosovo on March 24th, 1999, as part of Operation Allied Force. Precision guided missiles were directed on military sites, command centres, and critical infrastructure in an attempt to coerce Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević into ceasing the violence against the ethnic Albanian population and withdrawing Serbian forces from Kosovo. Despite diplomatic efforts, the attacks persisted, sparking debate about the use of military action for humanitarian purposes and drawing attention from all across the world. As the conflict deepened and more people were forced from their homes in Kosovo and Serbia, worries about civilian casualties and collateral damage grew. The international community found it difficult to comprehend the complex linkages between intervention, sovereignty, and human rights.



ROLE OF THE UNSC

FORMAL ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNSC PERTAINING TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS

Following the Contact Group's appeal, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 on March 31, 1998. This resolution urged for Kosovo's substantial self-administration and enforced an arms embargo on what remained of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, later recognized as Serbia and Montenegro, and subsequently as Serbia post-Montenegrin independence in 2006. Implemented under Chapter VII, the Resolution underscored that if constructive progress was not made, further actions would be considered.

Additionally, Resolution 1199, passed on September 23, 1998, extended the provisions of Resolution 1160. It reiterated the plea for a ceasefire and insisted on the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. The resolution conveyed deep concern regarding the worsening violence and humanitarian emergency in the area, which encompassed the displacement of civilians and human rights abuses. Furthermore, it urged unimpeded access for humanitarian agencies to deliver aid to those impacted by the conflict.

On October 24, 1998, Resolution 1203 was passed, granting authorization for the formation of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The primary responsibilities of the KVM included overseeing the ceasefire, ensuring adherence to UNSC resolutions, and facilitating dialogue among the conflicting parties.

NATO's decision to engage in air strikes during the Kosovo War without explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sparked significant legal and ethical debates. Traditional international law prioritizes UNSC endorsement for the use of military force, and NATO's actions were viewed by certain quarters as contravening this principle. The absence of a clear UNSC mandate triggered discussions regarding the legality and legitimacy of the military intervention. NATO contended that its actions were justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Citing widespread and severe human rights violations, such as ethnic cleansing and violence against civilians committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo, the alliance portrayed its intervention as necessary to safeguard civilians when the UNSC failed to act decisively. Nonetheless, the concept of humanitarian intervention itself remains contentious. While some legal experts and policymakers supported NATO's actions as a legitimate means to prevent atrocities, others voiced apprehensions about bypassing the UNSC and the potential repercussions for international law and order. The Kosovo War and NATO's air campaign underscored the intricate and ongoing debates surrounding the intersection of humanitarian considerations and adherence to established legal frameworks in global affairs.



UNSC'S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE KOSOVO CRISIS

Until March 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) dedicated significant diplomatic efforts to addressing the Kosovo crisis. These endeavours aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict and averting further escalation of violence. Central to the UNSC's diplomatic initiatives was the promotion of dialogue and negotiations between the conflicting parties. This encompassed encouraging direct discussions between Kosovo Albanians and Serbian authorities, as well as endorsing mediation endeavours by international actors and organizations. The UNSC actively pursued the establishment of international consensus and collaboration to tackle the crisis. This involved diplomatic activities such as meetings, consultations, and negotiations among UNSC members and other pertinent stakeholders. The council endeavoured to utilize diplomatic pressure and influence to foster compliance with UNSC resolutions, particularly concerning ceasefires and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. Engagement with regional organizations and neighbouring countries was also part of the UNSC's diplomatic strategy to garner support and involvement in resolving the Kosovo crisis.

Diplomatic channels were utilized to explore potential peace initiatives, seek diplomatic solutions, and facilitate dialogue among all parties involved in the conflict. Overall, the UNSC's diplomatic efforts were geared toward promoting dialogue, mediation, and international cooperation to seek a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis and address humanitarian and security concerns in the region. These efforts were embedded within a broader international diplomatic framework aimed at addressing conflicts and crises through diplomatic means and multilateral cooperation.

During the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian considerations took centre stage in international discourse and within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The intensifying conflict, marked by violence, civilian displacement, and human rights abuses, raised urgent humanitarian issues that demanded immediate attention. The UNSC expressed profound concern over the humanitarian plight in Kosovo, particularly regarding the safety and well-being of civilians trapped in the conflict's crossfire. Reports detailing ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, and widespread violence against civilians sparked global alarm and a collective call for swift action to alleviate the humanitarian emergency. The UNSC stressed the imperative of granting unrestricted access for humanitarian organizations to deliver aid to those affected by the crisis. This encompassed reaching displaced populations, refugees, and vulnerable communities in Kosovo to provide vital assistance such as food, shelter, medical aid, and protection services.

Recognizing the pivotal role of humanitarian aid in alleviating suffering, preserving lives, and addressing urgent needs, especially among women, children, and the elderly, the Council emphasized the necessity of ensuring unimpeded humanitarian access. Furthermore, the UNSC underscored the importance of facilitating the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes once the security situation permitted. This aspect of humanitarian concern focused on supporting the repatriation and reintegration of individuals and families who had been



forcibly uprooted or fled their residences due to the conflict. The resolutions and declarations issued by the Council reiterated the international community's dedication to safeguarding civilians, upholding human rights, and tackling the humanitarian dimensions of the Kosovo crisis through coordinated humanitarian efforts and assistance.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) backed the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The KVM's core function was to oversee the ceasefire agreement among the conflicting parties in Kosovo, verify compliance with UNSC resolutions, and facilitate dialogue and collaboration among the involved parties. This mission involved deploying international observers and monitors to key locations in Kosovo to supervise the implementation of agreements and report any breaches or incidents. The KVM's on-the-ground presence provided crucial information and insights into the evolving situation in Kosovo. It aided in documenting human rights violations, monitoring troop and weapon movements, and assessing the overall security and humanitarian conditions in the region.

Furthermore, the mission contributed to fostering trust and confidence among the parties by serving as a neutral and impartial observer. Moreover, the UNSC mandated the KVM to coordinate its activities with other international organizations and agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution efforts in Kosovo. This collaborative approach aimed to address both the immediate humanitarian needs of affected populations and the broader political and security challenges facing the region. Additionally, various international organizations and agencies were actively involved in delivering humanitarian aid to the affected populations in Kosovo. These efforts sought to alleviate the suffering of refugees, internally displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups affected by the conflict. The UNSC's endorsement of international presence and monitoring mechanisms underscored the global community's commitment to addressing the crisis, fostering peace, and upholding human rights standards in Kosovo during this crucial period.



TIMELINE

6th Century - Slavs start to settle in the region, which escapes Byzantine/Roman rule and turns into a contentious border region.

12th Century - Kosovo falls under Serbian authority and grows to become the centre of the Serbian empire. During this time, numerous Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries are constructed.

1389, 28 June - 500 years of Turkish Ottoman dominance are inaugurated by the epic Battle of Kosovo. Many Christian Serbs flee the area during the next few decades. The balance of religion and ethnicity has shifted over the centuries to favour Muslims and Albanians.

1689-90 - The Austrian invasion fails.

1912 - Balkan Wars: The 1913 Treaty of London recognizes Serbia's regaining of control over Kosovo from the Turks.

1918 - Kosovo is incorporated into Serbia's kingdom.

1941 - During World War II, a large portion of Kosovo is incorporated into a larger Albania under Italian rule.

1946 - The territory of Kosovo becomes part of the Yugoslav union.

1974 - The autonomous status of Kosovo is recognized by the Yugoslav constitution, granting the province de facto self-government.

1987 - Future president Slobodan Milosevic rallies a group of Kosovo Serbs during a pivotal moment in his ascent to power. They are protesting against what they perceive to be persecution by the community's majority, the Albanians.

1989 - Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, continues to revoke the autonomous rights outlined in the 1974 constitution. A law is passed denying Kosovo Albanians the right to own property and employment. In Kosovo, tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians lose their employment. Kosovo's Albanian cultural institutions are suppressed by Serbia.

1990, July - Leaders of ethnic Albania announce their independence from Serbia. The government of Kosovo is dissolved by Belgrade.



1990, September - A national walkout is sparked by the killing of over 100,000 ethnic Albanian workers, including those in the government and media.

1991-1992 :Yugoslavia's Socialist Federal Republic (S.F.R.Y.) disintegrates. The former republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina all experience wars; in the latter two, Serbs carry out ethnic cleansing and take over large swaths of the nation. The international world punishes Yugoslavia in retaliation. The US rejects rump Yugoslavia as the new state and acknowledges the independence of the former Yugoslav countries.

1992, July - Ethnic Albanians establish a provincial legislature and choose novelist Ibrahim Rugova to lead the self-declared Republic of Kosova. Serbia claims that the election was not legitimate. The Kosovo Albanians start up a nonviolent resistance movement against Belgrade's harsh government.

November 21, 1992: Dayton peace agreement was struck to put an end to hostilities and prepare the path for millions of people who had been displaced by the fighting to eventually return home.

1996: The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), claiming responsibility for several bombings and attacks on Serbian police and state officials, launches retaliatory actions in response to Belgrade's ongoing suppression and attacks by the Serbian police.

1997, October: Kosovo-Albanian student protests are put down by Serb police. In response, the KLA launches more assaults on the Serb police.

1998:

March 31: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1160, which imposes an embargo on weapons and supplies to the FRY and denounces the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces against civilians in Kosovo.

April: In a referendum opposing foreign mediation in Kosovo, 95% of Serbs cast their ballots. The Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) decides to reinstate some of the sanctions that had been removed against Yugoslavia, with the exception of Russia.

September 23: Resolution 1199, calling for an end to hostilities, is approved by the UN Security Council (China abstains).



September 24: NATO approves two contingency action plans, one for airstrikes and the other for monitoring and upholding a cease-fire agreement, should one be struck. This marks the first official move toward military intervention in Kosovo.

October 1: At the British government's request, special UN Security Council consultations on the Kosovo issue start.

October 13: NATO passes an activation order ("ACTORD"), giving the Secretary General the go ahead to launch airstrikes. The directive states that execution will start in about 96 hours.

October 15: In order to sign the agreement allowing NATO forces to oversee Serbia's compliance with UN Resolution 1199, Secretary General Solana of NATO departs for Belgrade.

October 16: 2,000 personnel of the Kosovo Verification Mission are scheduled to move in when OSCE President Geremek signs an agreement. NATO extends President Milosevic's deadline for the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" to abide by the conditions of the Kosovo agreement, giving him until October 27 to do so.

October 24: The OSCE agreement is endorsed and full cooperation from both parties is demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1203, which is passed.

November: Ambassador William Walker, an American, leads the Kosovo Verification Mission, which starts to arrive and operate. Its goal swiftly shifts from verification to attempting to prevent violent conflict through diplomacy and mediation.

December 23: Along the key route that connects the province capital Pristina to Belgrade, the Yugoslav Army and internal security police launch military operations close to Podujevo in northern Kosovo. The US disapproves of this behavior.

1999:

January 15: In the village of Racak, the bodies of forty-five ethnic Albanians are found.

January 21: Since late December, 20,000 individuals have fled their homes, 5,000 of whom are from the Racak area alone, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

January 29: The six-nation contact group convenes in London and issues a deadline for Serbs and ethnic Albanians to travel to France for peace negotiations to begin on February 6. The duration of these discussions is one week, though it may be extended to two if significant



progress is found.

January 30: The Secretary General may approve airstrikes on targets on Yugoslav soil, since the North Atlantic Council has once again agreed.

February 1- 4: Kosovo's political elite announces they would take part in the suggested peace negotiations. According to a KLA spokeswoman, the KLA will round out the Albanian delegation during the negotiations by sending delegates as well. The Serbian government consents to take part in the negotiations after a vote in its parliament.

February 23: The negotiations come to an end after the deadline is again extended by three days. The delegation of ethnic Albanians says it wants to go back home and conduct additional consultations before signing the political agreement, although it agrees in principle. As long as there is talk of a military annex that includes a "NATO-led" peacekeeping presence in Kosovo, the Serbs will not budge.

March 15: Resuming discussions at the Parisian Kleber Center. The Rambouillet discussions last month resulted in the interim agreement that the ethnic Albanian delegation signed.

March 18: The peace negotiations in Paris are halted.

March 19: Kosovo Verification Mission withdraws.

March 21: In a last-ditch diplomatic attempt, the international community dispatches Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade to give Milosevic a "final warning".

March 22: If necessary, the NAC gives Secretary-General Solana permission to make decisions on a wide spectrum of aviation activities after additional consultations.

March 24: NATO airstrikes began.

March 25: Diplomatic ties between the Yugoslav government and the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are severed.

March 27: Ethnic Albanians start migrating to Albania and Macedonia after being driven from their homes in Kosovo. Concurrently, the Russian Duma passes a motion denouncing the acts of NATO and delaying the ratification of the Start II agreement.



NOTES ON PAPERWORK

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

The Kosovo Crisis is a multifold topic, with several issues of equal importance which must be discussed over the course of committee. Thus, a huge weightage will be given on resolutions and other forms of paperwork while they must focus on providing feasible solutions to the situation at hand. Following are some of the issues which delegates must address not only in their paperwork, but throughout the course of the committee. We expect delegates to address other key events throughout the course of the committee, thus, this list must serve as only a general guidance for delegates, and it should in no way limit their efforts to gather the research and information that would prove to be a key in the success of this committee.

1. What actions were taken to address the Kosovo crisis up until 28th March 1998?
2. How was compliance with ceasefire agreements monitored in Kosovo and what improvements will be made moving further?
3. What were/will be the key responsibilities of international missions or organizations involved in Kosovo?
4. What were the main objectives of UN Security Council resolutions related to the Kosovo crisis?
5. What were the historical, ethnic, and political factors contributing to the Kosovo crisis?
6. What steps will be taken to promote human rights and democracy-building efforts in Kosovo?
7. How will the challenges that were encountered in implementing ceasefire agreements and resolving the Kosovo crisis be mitigated?
8. What measures will be taken to ensure the protection of civilians, including vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly?
9. What steps will be taken to ensure the protection and rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees from Kosovo, both within the region and in neighboring countries?
10. How will the challenges that were faced in delivering humanitarian aid and accessing vulnerable populations in Kosovo particularly in areas with ongoing conflict or security concerns be solved?
11. What efforts will be made to address the health and well-being of individuals affected by the conflict in Kosovo?



POSITION PAPERS AND COMMUNIQUE

Please note, your position papers are due on the **11th of May, 2024, 11:59 pm**. We expect the position papers to briefly include the statement of the issue, policy of the allotment and at least a minimum of 3 solutions pertaining to the agenda. However, this is a brief outline of the position papers we expect and you are free to include as many sub topics as desired by you while keeping in mind and including the key aspects of the position paper we have mentioned. Please note that position papers may be a maximum of 5 pages. Kindly, mail your position papers to the official E-Mail ID of the committee (oscelmcmun24@gmail.com) and adhere to the aforementioned deadline.

Also note, this committee will **NOT** accept any pre-written communiques prior to the committee. Communication lines will open in the due course of the committee itself.

Please refer to the Conference Handbook for other designated details pertaining to procedure, resolutions, working papers and samples.

CHARTER

All paperwork in this committee will be written while strictly adhering to the UN Charter. All speeches and paperwork in this committee must abide by the guidelines set by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975. While these are not legally binding on the delegates, they are political declarations that you are expected to follow the principles of. However, the UN Charter is legally binding and delegates may be held accountable for violations of the aforementioned charter.



CITATIONS

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